

R. A. Schermerhorn*

Minorities in the Census of India, 1971

It is unfortunate that the global population explosion almost monopolizes the attention of demographers when they analyze census reports from the developing nations. Because of its very salience, however, it tends to distract attention away from other really important topics that require demographic analysis but seldom get as much as they deserve. In the case of India, like several other countries of the third world, one of these "other topics" is the present status of minority groups that are potential sources of disunity and conflict in times of rapid change. This paper explores selected features of population contours for a number of minority groups as revealed in the census of India for 1971¹.

Although some writers would question my temerity, I begin with a *statistical* minority often unremarked in India, namely women. In 1971, India had a population of 283,936,614 males and 264,013,195 females, or a ratio of 930 females to 1,000 males in sharp contrast to the United States where in 1970 there were 98,912,192 males and 104,299,734 females². Warren Thompson declares that the usual male/female ratios

*The author hereby extends his thanks to Professor Jerry St. Dennis of Claremont Men's College for doing a number of computations used throughout this paper.

1. The present analysis forms a part of the forthcoming work entitled *Ethnic Plurality in India—Selected Profiles*.

2- Census of India 1971 .Union Table C VII; *India, a Reference Annual 1974*, p. 10, Table 1.8 ; and *World Almanac, A Book of Facts*, 1974 edition, p. 159.

are between 95 and 100 "and that any ratio outside this range calls for explanations" (Thompson. 1965, 74). In the case of India, several factors can be advanced to explain this fact: (1) Women's high rate of maternal mortality with multiple births under non-hygienic conditions; (2) a higher suicide rate among women ; (3) a relative neglect of girl babies; (4) much manual labor during pregnancy in the female work force; (5) undernourishment of married females, who usually eat after the males have eaten and subsist on whatever food is left over ; and (6) the taboo on treatment of women by male doctors which deprives countless women of any medical attention at all. These factors may not account for the differentials completely ; they are the ones I would advance in a preliminary analysis.

What is harder to explain, however, is the secular trend revealed in decennial enumerations. These show that the number of females per thousand males has shown a continuing decline from 972 in 1901 to 930 in 1971, each decade recording successively lower figure, with the exception of only 3941-51. Why is the proportion of females dropping? We do not know. Our expectation would be quite the opposite since life expectancy is rising for both men and women³. Some undiscovered factor in Indian life appears to be lethal to women. Yet, there is surprisingly no move to initiate research on such questions.

We have not, however, included women among the minorities,⁴ since they could hardly be classified among ethnic groups that are the focus of attention here. The communities examined are : the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Jains, Sikhs, Muslims, Christians, Anglo-Indians, Jews, Parsis, and Chinese. A summary of their numbers and percentage to the total population of India in 1971 is as shown in Table 1.

Numerically, the minorities fall into three disproportionate clusters: (1) the smaller minorities, each of which falls below one per cent of the all-India population—Jains, Anglo-Indians, Jews, Parsis and Chinese; (2) minorities of intermediate size, Sikhs and Christians, whose numbers in each case lie between 1 and 6 per cent of India's total; and (3) the salient

3. India, A Reference Annual 1974, *op. cit.*, Table 8.2, p. 80.

4. For sidelights on women as a "minority" in the U. S., cf. Helen Mayer Hacker, "Women as a Minority Group," in Edward Sagarin, ed.. *The Other Minorities*, Waltham, Mass., Ginn & Co., 1971.

minorities comprised of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims, each accounting for much higher proportions of the total population.

TABLE 1—MINORITY POPULATIONS OF INDIA, 1971 WITH PERCENTAGES

| <i>Community</i> | <i>1971 Population</i> | <i>Percentage of total Indian Population</i> | |
|----------------------|------------------------|--|---------|
| Scheduled Castes | 79,995,896 | | 14.60 |
| Scheduled Tribes | 38,015,162 | | 6.94 |
| Jains | 2,604,646 | | .48 |
| Sikhs | 10,378,797 | | 1.89 |
| Muslims | 61,417,934 | | 11.21 |
| Christians | 14,223,382 | | 2.60 |
| Anglo-Indians* | 250,000 | | .05 |
| Jews** | 16,000 | | .0029 |
| Parsis | 91,226 | | .0167 |
| Chinese*** | 53,000 | | .0097 |
| Total all minorities | 207,046,083 | Total per cent | 37.7993 |

*Estimate by Frank Anthony, Anglo-Indian designate to Lok Sabha, in 1968 publication.

**Estimate in Schifra Strizower, 1971, 5. Census reports omit totals for Jews, including them within the category «f "others". Local figures (as for Bombay) are available. However, because of heavy emigration of Jews to Israel, Strizower's estimate is probably more accurate than the census summation would be.

***Based on estimates from Taipei authorities (Cf. San-Dou Chang, 1968) since the 1971 census reports available to me have contained no data on Chinese residents.

Regarding the first cluster, Kingsley Davis rightly observes that the smallest communities—to which he adds the Christians in his remarks—"have played a role in Indian affairs out of all proportion to their numerical strength." (Davis, 1951, 178) However, the data are uneven. The census has entirely omitted Anglo-Indians from the last two decennial enumerations of 1961 and 1971, has made conflicting estimate of the Chinese which, at any rate, do not appear in the regular reports, and given only local statistics for the Jews while absorbing their totals into the blanket category of "others" in the computation of religious groups.

In the case of Jews and Anglo-Indians, we have evidence from community reports of extensive emigration abroad. About Jews, their authori-

ties estimate that within ten years or so, nearly the entire population (with the exception of the very oldest residents) will have migrated to Israel. Likewise out migration of Anglo-Indians has continued since national independence, though the process is less rapid than in the case of the Jews; personal interviews in the Anglo-Indian community have convinced me that a second peak of their emigration in the 1960's now is tapering off. But detailed research in the passport office is needed for more accurate emigration statistics. There are many reasons why these are needed⁵.

The minorities of less than one per cent are almost completely urban. All Anglo-Indians and almost all the Chinese⁶ live in urban areas. Jews and Parsis each have a reported tiny rural contingent although the confirming data are not available to me. Computation from the census shows that Jains were 59.83 percent urban and 40.17 percent rural in 1971. Parsis, Jews and Jains are the religious minorities most often bracketed together as urbanized, literate, and slow-growing minorities ; this has been true since at least the 1940's. Even at that period, Davis pointed out that Parsis had the lowest ratio of children to married women of any religious community, while the Jains came next (Davis, *op. cit.*, 184-185). A comparison of the Parsi populations in 1961 and 1971 shows an absolute decline from 100,000 to 91,266, a reduction which, unlike that of the Jews, cannot be attributed to emigration⁷.

In the intermediate cluster, we have two religious communities of comparable size whose demographic curve has interesting parallels, Sikhs and

5. They would be useful for determining demographic trends not only among Anglo-Indians and Jews, but among others like Chinese who had considerable exodus after the Indian-Chinese hostilities of 1962, the Muslims who had a small but steady outflow to Pakistan, East Africa and Britain over the years since independence, and Sikhs who have been departing in limited numbers for all parts of the globe for more than a generation. It is a plausible conjecture that India, with negligible immigration over the years has not felt the need for detailed statistics on the related phenomenon of emigration.

6. The inference is based on personal interviews with leaders.

7. A Parsi demographer has analyzed this long-term trend in great detail. Cf. S. F. Desai, 1948. Parsis are the only religious minority who have an excess of females over males. Concerning the Jains, Davis observes that their taboo on widow remarriage is the strictest among religious groups and that if their widows were permitted to marry, this could increase their population in the long run as much as 20 per cent. (Davis, *op. cit.*, 184). (Census of India 1971, Series 1, Paper 2 of 1972. *Religion*. Union Table CVII, Appendix, p. 32).

Christians. Both these groups augmented their numbers strikingly through conversions from Hinduism in the early 1900s; but their growth dwindled down to a rate no more than natural increase after independence.⁸ The rate of increase for these two communities was about the same between 1961 and 1971, the Sikhs growing at the rate of 32.38 per cent and the Christians, of 32.6. The two differ somewhat more in their rural-urban ratio : the Sikhs showing an urban proportion of 19.04 per cent and the Christians, of 25.01 per cent as compared to the corresponding proportion 19.9 per cent for the total population⁹.

Turning now to the salient minorities of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims who together form the bulk of India's minority population, we find that these are also the ones who constitute the greatest problems of integration as defined by both the public and the government. This is not purely a function of size since the Muslims are so often identified with the "minority problem" in common parlance, though they are the smallest of the three salient minorities numerically. Cumulative evidence which I have presented elsewhere¹⁰ emphasizes the relatively high conflict level between each of these communities and the dominant group of caste Hindus. Antagonism and sporadic violence appear to be more reciprocal in the case of the Scheduled Castes, initiated more from the minority side in the case of Scheduled Tribes, and at least disproportionately from the dominant group against the Muslims. Relative magnitude is hardly a cogent explanation for these relationships. However, this is not the place to defend such a thesis. Other less dramatic factors demand our attention.

First is the issue of accurate counting. Authorities are pretty well agreed that the least dependable statistics for any ethnic category are those for the tribals. Where acculturation has taken place it is difficult at best

8. Rapid growth up to 1941 is traced in *Davis, op. cit.*, 178, 183, 186-8. The tapering off process has been confirmed chiefly by interviews with leaders, though authorities can be quoted at least for the Christians in this regard. Cf. J. P. Alter and H.J. Singh, 1966, 132; and E. Y. Campbell, 1966, 155.

9. Computed from Census of India 1971, Series 1, Paper 2 of 1972. *Religion*. Rural and Urban Distribution of Religious groups, p. xiv.

10. In the forthcoming volume, *Ethnic Plurality in India*, especially Chaps. 3, 4, 7, 13 and Appendix 3.

to make an accurate classification ; to what degree must cultural borrowing take place before an individual can be categorized as Hindu or Christian rather than tribal ? Is ascription the criterion ? Public assignment ? Self-identification ? An additional source of error is misrepresentation. Both in the 1940's when Davis was compiling his population data (Davis, *op. cit.*, 188-89) and in the 1960's when Furer-Haimendorf found a similar bias in census statistics, it was clear that census interviewers were systematically listing an indeterminately large number of tribals as Hindus, with or without warrant. Both these authorities conclude that the statistics for tribals are a substantial undercount while those for Hindus are a corresponding overcount with no way of estimating the extent of error. I stumbled across a different type of miscalculation when scanning the figures for tribals during 1969 when I found that no tribals at all were listed for Uttar Pradesh in the 1961 census. Living in Kanpur at the time, I therefore decided that any interviewing of tribal personnel would have to be planned for a visit to Bihar. To my surprise and dismay, the *Lucknow Herald* several months later announced a meeting of U. P. tribals in the state capital—an item that came to my attention too late for me to attend. I was naturally puzzled, however, at the appearance of these tribal members out of census-free air. However their presence was officially confirmed later. I did not discover it until 1973 where, in the Berkeley library I found the tribals of U. P. eventually materialized in the census of 1971 to number 198,565.

Conversely I discovered that the census of 1961 reported 14,132 tribals while the 1971 census listed none. Reversing the field again, the territory of Goa, Daman and Diu had no tribals reported in the 1961 census but 7,654 in 1971¹¹. Thus the census engaged simultaneously in genocide and resuscitation of tribal groups by statistical manipulation¹². However an even more staggering feat came to my attention when I found two sets of figures in the 1971 census for the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands (now renamed Lakshadweep). In one set the per cent of tribals in the

11. Census of India 1971. Paper 1 of 1972. *Final Population*. Table 6. Tribal Population of States and Union Territories in Order of Size for Tribal Aggregates Together with Percentage of Scheduled Tribes to State Populations, 1971.

12. The term "genocide by census redefinition" was coined by Myron Weiner who used a parallel expression, "ethnogenesis", for a newly defined group. Quoted in Clifford Geertz, 1963, 126.

island population was given as 92.86 per cent and their number as 29,540. In quite a different table, entitled Distribution of Population by Religion 1961 and 1971, the Muslim population of the Islands is given as 30,019 or 94.37 per cent of the total in 1971. This is an exploit that puts the former in the shade. Here is a process of *substitution* that took no time at all; the 90 per cent tribal and 90 per cent Muslim are coeval items in the document¹³. The inaccuracy of statistics for Scheduled Tribes is amply underscored by these examples.

Accepting the census figures at face value, however, we find that just as the Anglo-Indians are the most urban minority in terms of residence, the Scheduled Tribes are the most rural, with over 96 per cent in that category. On the other hand, the Scheduled Castes have migrated to the cities in greater numbers and are only 88 per cent rural; they have as many as 9.5 million members in towns and cities over 5,000, while the Scheduled Tribes number a little more than a million in all urban places¹⁴.

The Muslims are India's largest religious minority with 61 million adherents making up 11.21 per cent of the population. On the basis of a purely religious classification, when we add the Muslim total to that of the Hindus, this gives us a figure of 514,710,020 or 93.93 per cent of the all-India population in 1971¹⁵. To put it another way, less than 7 per cent of India's people are to be found outside Hinduism or Islam, provided these totals are accepted as they stand. However we have already seen reason to believe that the figures for Scheduled Tribes are underestimated in favor of the Hindus; the latter, therefore, must be overestimated. By adding Muslim and Hindu percentages together we have brought this discrepancy into sharp focus. It is then possible to clinch the argument by going one step further and adding the percentages of the non-Hindu and non-Muslim minorities (this eliminates the Scheduled Castes and Muslims,

13. Census of India 1971. Paper 1 of 1972. *Final Population*. Table 6. Tribal Population of States and Union Territories in Order of Size for Tribal Aggregates Together with Percentage of Scheduled Tribes to State Populations 1971. Also Census of India 1971, Series 1. Paper 2 of 1972. *Religion*. Statement. Distribution of Population by Religion 1961 and 1971, p. 4.

14. Computed from Census of India 1971. Paper 1 of 1972. *Final Population*.

15. Census of India 1971, Series 1. Paper 2 of 1972. *Religion*. Statement. Distribution of Population by Religion 1961 and 1971, p. 2.

both). Then the total percentage of all the rest comes to 11.93 instead of the 7 per cent that is supposed to be the remainder from the addition of Hindu and Muslim totals. In fact the Scheduled Tribes *alone* make up the missing 7 per cent. This gives some idea of the error involved.

Another complexity remains. Examination of Table 1 will doubtless raise the question as to why Buddhists are not included. The 1971 census states that there were 3,812,325 members of this faith in that year or 7 tenths of 1 per cent of the population¹⁸. This should certainly entitle them to a position alongside other religious minorities. My reply would be that I have deliberately excluded them because of their ambiguous status. As is well known, Scheduled Castes staged a series of mass conversion to Buddhism in Maharashtra during the 1950's beginning with the dramatic ceremony set up by Ambedkar on March 18, 1956 in Nagpur. This produced such a legion of followers that the census of India reports a growth rate of 2267.01 per cent in the decennium 1951-61 but this dropped to an insignificant 17.20 per cent in 1961-71 which is "less than even the natural growth rate"¹⁷. Two questions then remain ; is the growth of Buddhism simply a flash in the pan that will soon disappear ?¹⁸ and will the social definition of the Buddhists as renegade Untouchables by the surrounding Hindus give them the escape from stigma they expect from it ? As long as the answers to these questions remain uncertain and as long as Indian Buddhism is not a fully consolidated position separate from that of untouchability, it seems justifiable for the time being to disregard the Buddhist category in the census and merge its statistics with those of the Scheduled Castes, accepting the public definition of the two as essentially one for the time being. In another generation this may no longer be possible.

In their large series of tables, the census of India uses a more or less standard classification, compared the main religions. These include the

16. Census of India 1971. Series 1. Paper 2 of 1972. Religion. Statement. Distribution of Population by Religion, p. 3.

17. Census of India 1971. Series 1. Paper 2 of 1972. Religion. Note on Individual Religions, p 22.

18. Another ceremony of mass conversion to Buddhism took place in Delhi on March 22, 1973 (K. L. Sharma, 1973, 68). It is still too early to determine whether a similar spurt of growth will follow this event.

usual six : Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. Because of the public controversy aroused on the issue of growth, I present one of these tables below; this deals with growth as measured by per cent increase of the religious community over the decade. For the purpose of enlarging the coverage, I have added the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

TABLE 2—PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF HINDUS AND SELECTED MINORITIES IN INDIA, 1961-1971

| <i>Community</i> | <i>Percentage Increase 1961-71</i> |
|------------------|------------------------------------|
| Hindus | 23.69 |
| Scheduled Castes | 24.18 |
| Scheduled Tribes | 25.99 |
| Muslims | 30.85 |
| Christians | 32.60 |
| Sikhs | 32.28 |
| Buddhists | 17.20 |
| Jains | 28.48 |
| All | 24.8 |

Adapted from (a) Census of India 1971. Series 1. Paper 2 of 1972. Religion. Figures at a Glance. Census of India 1971. Population by Religion, and (b) Paper 1 of 1972. Final Population.....Growth percentages for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are computed from (b).

Certain conservative leaders of the Hindu community, especially those connected with the All-India Anti-Family Planning Action Committees have tried to arouse public opinion against Muslims by pointing out that the latter are growing more rapidly than the Hindus. Muslims increased their per cent of the Indian population from 10.70 in 1961 to 11.21 in 1971 by registering a growth rate of 30.85 as compared to that of 23.69 for the Hindus. Those who view this comparison with alarm attribute the low Hindu rate to government programs for family planning which they believe is specially directed against Hindus. On the other hand they see the high Muslim rate resulting from exempting Muslims from such programs, conspiratorial resistance to the programs, or to polygamy in the Muslim community. V. P. Pethe, in an article for the *Economic and Political Weekly*, has laid these fears to rest by citing evaluative studies of

local family planning programs affecting a number of religious groups where all of them are targeted and there seem to be no differentials of acceptance whatever. He points out too that polygamy is fast declining among Muslims and that in a number of areas its incidence is equally high among Hindus¹⁹. Finally, using some of the figures reproduced in Table 2, he shows that the Hindus differ little from the national average and that the highest rates of increase occur, not among Muslims, but among Sikhs and Christians. Yet no apprehension is expressed over their rate of growth. Hence such publicized fears about Muslim overpopulation are groundless and extreme.

Table 2 raises other questions. Why do Christians have the highest growth rate and Scheduled Castes the lowest?²⁰ The most likely hypothesis, it seems to me, has to do with medical care rather than with fertility rates which should not show great differentials. But in the Christian community, the widespread use of doctors and hospitals, the disproportionate number of nurses, and the community concern to furnish health facilities for its members will have the effect of lowering mortality rates at all ages without being too great a drag on natural increases. Such life-preserving amenities are notably lacking among the Scheduled Castes whose life conditions are sufficiently wretched to provoke comment among those who have the slightest acquaintance with their segregated quarters in the villages. It would be easier to prove the cogency of this reasoning if we had mortality tables for the different communities and the age differentials as well. India will find it difficult to formulate realistic policies for its minority citizens until the census includes such information along with such items as income levels and occupational distribution for each of its constituent communities.

In closing I would like to elaborate briefly on a discovery that came my way while poring over a page of statistics on agricultural populations that I almost set aside as of little importance for my own interests. Neverthe-

19. V. P. Pethe, 1973, 75-78. Pethe also points out that, mathematically speaking, 5 women married to the same man in a polygamous situation should give birth to no more children than 5 women married to 5 different men in a monogamous situation. In fact the number in the former case might well be smaller.

20. Omitting the Buddhists whose defections may have made their rate abnormally low.

less, for fear that I might miss something, I started copying details by states and was soon struck by the fact that a clearly visible trend occurred between 1961 and 1971 in the percentage of agricultural laborers in comparison with the total number of the work force. Since agricultural laborers own no land, work by the day or hour, are paid the lowest wages in India (often non-monetary), and can be hired or fired at the will of the landlord or tenant, it would follow that a steady increase in the percentage of agricultural laborers would make a fine operational index for charting an economic decline in rural areas. And this is precisely what the statistics showed, i.e., a steady increase. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, the proportion of the work force who were agricultural laborers increased from 28.59 in 1961 to 37.40 in 1971. In Assam the percentage almost trebled, rising from 3.59 to 9.35, in Kerala it rose from 17.38 to 30.68, in Haryana from 6.90 to 16.23, in the Punjab from 9.65 to 20.03, in Tamil Nadu from 18.42 to 29.13, in West Bengal from 15.30 to 25.75.

It is unnecessary to continue quoting figures from the states since they all, without a single exception, showed percentages of agricultural laborers increasing in the decennium. National totals corroborate the trend ; for India as a whole the corresponding figures are 16.71 and 25.76. Taking the rural areas by themselves, the figures are 18.87 and 29.98 percent²¹. That the increasing poverty revealed by these statistics is an actuality is shown by P. K. Bardhan's detailed study in 1973 which indicated that 14 out of 16 states had higher percentage of rural people below the minimum level of living in 1967.68 than was the case in 1960-61 (P. K. Bardhan, 1973, 249). Recent famine conditions, food riots, shifting government policy on wholesale trade in wheat and the national crisis that followed have been much in the news²². An emergency to top all others was then added in early 1974 with the price hike in Arabian oil which had the effect of more than doubling India's fertilizer costs and severely crippling future wheat production at a time when quite literally India is running out of wheat²³.

21. Census of India 1971. Series 1 Paper 1 of 1971. Supplement, Provisional Population totals, pp. 52-63 and 66-67.

22. For a summary of these conditions cf. B. G. Verghese's articles in the *Overseas Hindustan Times*, April 4, 11 and 18, 1974.

23. Don Shannon, "Plea Made to U. S. in Food, Fertilizer Crisis", *Los Angeles Times*, April 26, 1974.

The purpose of this detour on economic decline is not to call attention to the current depression in India *per se*, but to emphasize its impact on India's most disadvantaged minority—the Scheduled Castes. As the number of agricultural laborers increases, this implies a corresponding growth in the number of untouchables entering their ranks, since the latter form a disproportionate part of the landless labor force in the village (Sidney Verba, B. Ahmed and A Bhatt, 1971, 81, 82). As economic conditions deteriorate, the number of Scheduled Caste members forced into the ranks of India's most impoverished army—the agricultural laborers—rises. Their precarious position then puts them closer and closer to the actual starvation line. Revolutionary implications of these conditions are not hard to seek in West Bengal where Naxalite agitation has been so prominent.

There are other responses besides the threat of revolt. Perhaps the most intriguing and even quixotic one occurred recently in Tamil Nadu where Mrs. Satyavani Muthu, the Harijan Welfare Minister, commenting on the desperate plight of her charges, stated publicly that "the Harijan community might have to organize itself as a militant group to fight for its due share in society. And Harijan mothers should shun family planning so that their numbers increase fast to give them greater thrust." When the state Governor incredulously asked her to clarify her remarks, she replied that "she was not against the family planning programme as such but she wanted the Harijan women to beget more children so that their community could fight for the rights on their own"²⁴. Here is a new weapon for Indian pressure groups and its use on behalf of this and other minorities could conceivably spread if it produced noticeable results. Such an anti-Lysistrata threat would not even require mobilization to enforce it but a simple inertia. The mind boggles at the implication for India's demographic balance.

References

1. Alter, James P. and Herbert, Jai Singh, 1966, "The Church in Delhi" in : Victor E. W. Hayward, (ed.), *The Church as Christian Community*, Three Studies of North Indian Churches, London, Lutterworth Press.
2. Anthony, Frank, 1968, A strategy for national integration, *The Review*, LIX (10), 9-14.

24. *Overseas Hindustan Times*, May 9, 1974.

3. Bardhan, Pranab K., 1973, On the incidence of poverty in rural India, *Political and Economic Weekly*, VIII (4, 5 and 6), Annual Number, (February) 245-254.
4. Campbell, Ernest Y., 1966, The Church in the Punjab, some aspects of life and growth, in ; Victor E. W. Hayward, (ed.), *The Church as Christian Community*, Three Studies of North Indian Churches, London, Lutterworth Press.
5. Chang, San Dou, 1968, The distribution and occupations of overseas Chinese, *The Geographic Review*, 58(1), 89-107.
6. Davis, Kingsley, 1951, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press.
7. Desai, Sapur Faredun, 1948, *A Community at the Cross-Road*, Bombay, New Book Co.
8. Forer-Haimendorf, Christoph von, 1967, "The Position of the Tribal Populations in Modern India", in : Philip Mason, (ed.), *India and Ceylon : Unity and Diversity*. London, Oxford University Press.
9. Geertz, Clifford, 1963, "The Integrative Revolution," in : Clifford Geertz, (ed.), *Old Societies and New States*, New York, Free Press.
10. Hacker, Helen Mayer, 1971, "Women as a Minority Group", in ; Edward Sagarin, (ed.), *The Other Minorities*, Waltham, Mass., Ginn & Co.
11. *India, A Reference Annual 1974*, New Delhi, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1974.
12. Mayo, Katherine, 1927, *Mother India*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co.
13. Pethe, Vasant P., 1973, Hindus, Muslims and the demographic balance in India, *Economic and Political Weekly*, VIII (2), 75-78.
14. Sharma, K. L., 1973, Downward social mobility : Some observations, *Sociological Bulletin*, 22(1), 59-77.
15. Strizower, Schifra, 1971, *The Bene Israel of Bombay*, A study of a Jewish Community, New York, Schocken Books.
16. Thompson, Warren S., and David T. Lewis, 1965, *Population Problems*, 5th ed., New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co.
17. Varba, Sidney, Bajhiruddin Ahmed and Anil Bhatt, 1971, *Caste, Race and Politics, A Comparative Study of India and the United States*, Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications.